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Determinants of Collateral

Discussion EFA 19/8/2004

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Discussion of “Determinants of Collateral”



■ Outline

■ Summary

- Main idea & contribution
- Tested hypotheses: expected relations
- Findings

■ Comments

- Data
 - Methodology
 - Other suggestions
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Discussion of “Determinants of Collateral”



- Main idea and contribution of paper
 - Simultaneous test of theoretical implications for correlation between collateral and (i) borrower risk (ii) lending relationship (iii) competition (iv) lender preferences / experience
 - Use ex-post and ex-ante measures of borrower risk
 - Long panel allow for good test of bank relationship implication
 - All loans registered: another measure of intensity of relation
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- Tested relations between collateral &
 - Borrower default risk
 - Adverse selection/ex-ante a.i. (BesankoThakor87??) [+?]
 - Hidden action/ex-post a.i. (BootThakorUdell91) [-]
 - Duration of lending relationship
 - Demonstrate quality (BootThakor94) [-]
 - Hold-up problem (Greenbaum89/Sharpe90/Rajan92) [+]
 - Degree of competition
 - DIR: Interaction effect with borrower quality (BT87) [“+”]
 - INDIR: via relationship (Diamond91/P’sen&Rajan95) [+]
 - Experience/preference of lender
 - Lazy banks (ManovePadilla99/01) [+]
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■ Findings

- Use of collateral increases with def_{t+1} and def_{t-1}
 - Use of collateral decreases with relation duration for l.t. loans, independent for s.t. loans
 - # lenders and #loans at bank give no robust results
 - Use of collateral increases with competition
 - Big and specialized banks require less collateral
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■ Data (1)

- What is a good ex-post measure of default risk
 - Does a $E[\text{def}_{t+1}]$ (proxied by def_{t+1}) affect demand for collateral for loans with different maturities in the same way?
 - def_{t+1} is an unbiased estimator of $E[\text{def}_{t+1}]$, but not of $E[\text{def}_{t+s}] \forall s$. Therefore:
 - If loans have different maturities, and most loans have relatively long durations, but few loans default early (at $t+1$) while most do so later on (after $t+1$), using def_{t+1} will overestimate the effect that ex-post default risk has on using collateral
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- Data (2)
 - Sample selection effect w.r.t. def_{t-1} ?
 - Choice of variables
 - Use financial ratios instead of total debt
 - Loan size as proxy for risk?
 - Output gap i.s.o. growth+cycle (theory?)
 - Why 2 lags of macro variables?
 - Bank size \approx market share
 - Why should $\text{partial corr}(r, \text{collateral}) < 0$?
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■ Methodology (1)

- Why separate models for s.t. and l.t. loans?
 - Maybe reason to be careful interpreting marginal effects (as opposed to parameters)
 - Different marginal effects of borrower risk (despite equal param. estim's) are artifact of different means
 - Can one compare coeff's on def_{t+1} from separate models?



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■ Methodology (2)

- Separate models for old and new borrowers
 - Can one compare coeff's on def_{t+1} from separate models?
 - Why multinomial logit i.s.o. ordered probit?
 - separate or identical param's for choice of amount of collateral (<50, 50-100, 100)
 - Spurious results due to size of data set?
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■ Other suggestions

- Many interesting results, but
 - What is quintessence of paper?
 - Which data set delivers “true” model?
 - How to interpret differences between population - and sample results?
 - Focus!



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- Other suggestions
 - Use bivariate or trivariate probit:
 - Step 1: choose s.t. or l.t. loan (depends on risk)
 - Step 2: collateral choice given loan type

